Why We Need Codes

Codes are said to be living documents because modern codes undergo constant changes. New developments in construction techniques are one cause of code changes. New advancements in construction methods are usually first allowed under the alternative methods of construction provisions of the code. New techniques or products go through a third party evaluation process that evaluates the scope of a new method, product or procedure, including its limitations. As they become more widely used and commonplace, their limitations or expanded use become more exposed and it is incorporated into the code with specific regulations. The modern codes generally go through a continuous three year development cycle, ensuring the codes "modernization". There are exceptions to this in some codes and standards, for instance NFPA may have irregular year code cycles, usually because of a complete reorganization of the particular code or standard and time limitations of the  committees involved in the code or standard writing process.

This was not always the case. Codes were once considered impediments to progress because they changed infrequently and did not keep pace with new developments in construction, including the re-invention of portland cement, the change from cast iron to steel framed buildings, and the invention of the elevator, which made the construction of tall buildings feasible. Tragedies and catastrophic events also change the codes, sometimes resulting in rather knee jerk reactions largely caused by unforeseen situations. These are some of the horrific events in history that have shaped the codes we use today:

Hotel Fires

MGM Grand Fire in Las Vegas  (NFPA Report) 84 to 85 (conflicting reports) people died and more than 700 were injured in this catastrophic event at the 26 story hotel in 1980. Starting in a first floor restaurant called the Deli, it was caused by an electrical short in a soffit. It rapidly traveled through the casino at a rate of 15 to 19 feet per second. Wall coverings and flame spread regulations were in place in the 1979 UBC, and these appear to have been largely ignored in the area of fire origin (A practice that continues to this day, witness the Station Fire, below). This disaster provided unfortunate proof that smoke can be just as dangerous as fire. Add to that scenario a partially sprinklered building and a largely undivided air conditioning system common to a huge area. Then add stair towers which were not properly constructed of fire-resistive materials, were not provided with effective barriers for fire and smoke penetration and in which the top and bottom doors were propped open and all doors in between those levels were locked from the stairwell side, effectively creating death traps for whomever entered the stairtowers, and you have a menu for immediate code changes that exist to this day. Smoke detector HVAC shutdown, greater protection for stair towers, greater emphasis on field control of interior finishes and emphasis on barriers for fire and smoke spread all evolved in the codes from this event. Here is an interesting historical report from the Clarke County Fire Department on this fire which includes witness statements and expert testimony. 

Pioneer Hotel in Tucson with 29 Fatalities. This fire occurred in 1970. A video with pictures of the hotel in its heyday is provided by the Tucson Historical Society. The fire was blamed on lack of sprinklers and alarms. Fire truck ladders could only reach 8 stories of the 11 story building. The fire raced through the fourth through twelfth floors, trapping many residents in their rooms and causing many to leap to their deaths. Among the dead were the Steinfelds, who occupied a 12ft Floor Penthouse in the hotel and had been previous owners of the hotel for 30 years. The aftermath of the fire killed the vitality of downtown Tucson, changing it from a vibrant destination to a sorrowful memory of the tragedy. The hotel is not listed on the National Register of Historic Places because of extensive remodeling after the fire that changed it to an office-apartment building. The fire was caused by arson, and a black teenager was convicted, but it is doubtful whether he was anything other than a convenient scapegoat. 

 Mizpah Hotel in Reno Nevada kills 12 This fire occurred in 2006 and was started by a mentally disturbed woman who worked at the primarily residential hotel and apparently got into an argument with another resident. She put a mattress up against the other resident's door and set it on fire. Both of these people survived. The building was built in 1922 as the Picolini Hotel and was added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1984. Though only three stories tall, it was large in footprint. Constructed of unreinforced masonry with an unfinished basement of post and beam construction, at its final configuration totaled almost 60,000 square feet. The report by the City of Reno describes mattresses stored in the hallways feeding the fire and the hallways rapidly filling with smoke to the floor level. Non-fire-resistive construction, lack of sprinklers and access to exits were cited as major defects in the subsequent fire reports. The fire alarm system, though described as "dated" in the City of Reno report, actually functioned properly and gave the first notice of the fire. Occupants of the hotel ignored the fire alarm as it went off frequently and was usually quickly silenced. The U.S. Fire Administration report  states the building was equipped with Class I and II standpipe systems, but the Class I system was not available to the fire department because of its location in the west stairwell was "compromised by heat and heavy smoke". The Class II system, for use by building occupants, did have a line deployed on the third floor, and the system had been inspected in March of the same year. Modern fire departments dislike such systems because the hose lines deteriorate and are impossible to test. Instead, they usually adapt them for their use by requiring original hoses be removed and adapters installed so their hoses can be used.

 International hotel fires are sometimes ignored by Americans because they assume, correctly in many cases, that other countries do not have the high safety standards they think we are subject to. One example is the Quezon City Manor Hotel Fire in 2001 that killed over 70 people, almost all of whom died from smoke inhalation rather than burns. Poor construction, bars on the hotel room windows to prevent burglary, no smoke alarms, no sprinklers and obstructed exits were all cited as causes of the high death rate. The hotel had been cited for major safety violations months before, but the Fire Marshall's boss did nothing to enforce compliance. China has had several major hotel fires, including the Tiantan Hotel Fire in Harbin, which killed 33, the Yanshan Hotel in Changsa, which killed 30 and the 1997 Shenzen Hotel Fire which killed 29. Cited in vague news reports are blocked exits, but there are no open or third party investigations and it is hard to verify actual conditions or causes. A fire at the Thai Royal Jomtien Resort killed 91 people and was investigated by NFPA.

 However, such a fire as the Dupont Plaza Hotel in Puerto Rico, which killed 97 people in 12 minutes, was not ignored by Americans or American code writers. Not only is Puerto Rico a territory of the United States, the hotel was originally built as a Sheraton in early 1960's, and was famous for its olympic sized swimming pool. Today it is known as the San Juan Marriott Resort & Stellaris Casino, and has been recently renovated. The fire was started by members of a union employed at the hotel, who were in the middle of a labor dispute. They set a can of Sterno on fire in a storage room filled with new furniture still wrapped in original packaging, which included foam plastics and mattresses. Rapidly out of control, it spread into the adjacent south ballroom, which had a significant amount of combustible furnishings and interior finishes. The ballroom flashed over in approximately 10 minutes, and the fire exploded into a two story foyer with glass walls that separated the ballroom from the casino, which was located on the second floor. About two minutes later, fuel from the heavy timber ceiling in the foyer caused the glass walls separating the casino to explode, effectively blocking two of the main exits from the casino and creating a wall of flame that swept the length of the casino in about twenty seconds. It is estimated that there were 150 people in the casino at the time of the fire. Within 14 minutes from the fire start, 84 of them were dead, all from flames, not smoke. The only people to survive were the ones who exited early and then a few minutes later, a few more broke wall to ceiling glass windows above the pool side and jumped to safety from the second floor. The Puerto Rican firefighters, called "Bomberos", exhibited consummate bravery during the rescue attempts. Hotel guests in the adjoining high rise tower, which was breached by smoke from the fire, were either directed to the roof or were able to take refuge for hours on exterior balconies. A police helicopter made repeated return trips to remove people from the roof, while brave bomberos climbed from balcony to balcony with ropes, rescuing stranded victims. NIST report on fire. NFPA investigation. Chip collector remembrance. You tube video of fire, Part 1, Part II, Part III.

 Paxton Hotel Fire, Chicago, March 16, 1993: This fire in a 140 room low income and elderly, permanent resident hotel killed 20 people, but twenty others were reported as missing and presumably died in the fire, since some bodies were completely incincerated. The hotel was built in the 1930's and was mixed construction. The construction features could not be fully investigated because access for fire investigators was limited to a small portion of the building. The fire apparently burned for 45 minutes to an hour before the fire department arrived, and the building's fire alarm system did not work. The fire spread through floor joist channels into vertical wall channels that were not firestopped. There were approximately 160 people in the hotel at the time, as all of the rooms were full and many people had guests. Due to the permanent resident nature of the hotel, a higher room fuel load contributed to the spread of the fire because many residents had a greater quantity of combustible personal possessions than normal for a transient population. Overhead lines in the area prohibited the deployment of aerial apparatus, so firefighters had to resort to ground ladders to rescue occupants from their rooms. Residents on the first floor had burglary/security bars over their windows, which firefighters had to forcibly remove, resulting in two deaths of people they could not get to in time. Many people jumped from their rooms to escape the flames. The hotel room doors were of wood and were not self-closing or rated. Only a few rooms were reported to have smoke detectors and none were ever found, due to the destruction of the building by flames. The building was completely destroyed, and firefighters had to back out of the building shortly after they arrived and fight the fire solely from the exterior.

 Other Hotel Incidents and Disasters

Hiatt Regency Skywalk Collapse in Kansas City

This tragedy was caused by modifications to Kansas City Building Codes to  encourage downtown development, mainly by elimination of the requirement for special inspectors, whose job it is to track field changes such as the structural modifications that occurred to the skywalks during construction and make sure they are reviewed by the engineer of record. Here is an additional article on the event.

Nightclub Fires

Cocoanut Grove

Rhythm Night Club

Beverly Hills Supper Club

The Station a pdf file on the incident   Video of Station Fire  More information on Station Nightclub Fire

Hospital Fires and Incidents - these events brought about the "defend in place" concept utilized for protection of patients today...............

List of hospital fires

The Cleveland Clinic - renowned today for its health care program, this hospital suffered a disaster in 1929 that almost closed its doors forever. Reports vary, but at least 122 people were killed.Here is the NFPA Fire Report. Here is the Wikepedia entry that describes the fire and hospital today.

St. Anthony's Hospital Fire- 77 people meet their end.

Warehouse Fires

Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse Fire

Six firefighters die in abandoned cold storage warehouse because of homeless firestarters, unregulated finish materials, and firefighting operations that contribute even more oxygen.

K-Mart Warehouse Fire

Code tradeoffs for fire wall openings to facilitate forklift traffic create missiles out of aerosol cans and destroy the entire facility after overcoming the sprinkler system.

Phoenix Warehouse Fire

Tilt up wall collapses less than an hour and 14 minutes after fire starts, sprinkler system overwhelmed.

Cold Storage Warehouse, Shreveport, LA

One firefighter injured, one dies in an ammonia explosion. Lessons not learned? Fire service and DOT like to classify ammonia as nonflammable gas and take a lackadaisical approach to it. However, Larry Fleur, ICC's own premier hazmat expert says this:

Theater Fires

Iroquois Theater - this is the fire that changed the way theatres are built forever............................

School Fires

Our Lady of Angels - students burn alive while sitting at their desks. This fire moved so fast some of them did not even get to the windows............................

New London,Texas School, 1937, approximately 298 people died in a massive gas explosion. Here is a link to the web site dedicated to the memorial of these people.

Collinwood School Fire, aka Lake View Elementary in Collinwood, Ohio 1908...........killed 172 students, two teachers and a rescuer. Community members watched children burn alive before their very eyes, helpless to do anything about it.  “… the children lay five or six deep, the fire had already reached them, and I could see the flames catch first one and then another… the fire swept through the hall, springing from one child to another catching their hair and the dresses of the girls.  The cries were dreadful to hear.” - Henry Ellis, rescuer
Here is a link to pictures of the replacement school that was built in closed in  torn down in 2004, reported to be haunted. The Wikepedia article on the fire is located here. A powerpoint presentation of the tragedy is available. A book, published in 1908, out of copyright by Marshall Everett about the disaster, complete with graphic photographs. And a short film, MP4 format. 

Dust Explosions

A pet peeve of ours, this industry and the oil refining industry seem to be of the "let's kill them, then put a bandaid on it" mentality of safety operations. Profits always come ahead of employees. All of the accidents in this industry are avoidable and are inevitably caused by lack of maintenance or attention, whether it be lack of housekeeping, bearing inspection, explosion venting, process design, safety procedures - whatever, it is ALL avoidable. in fact, as Brian Edwards, director of engineering at Atlanta-based Professional Engineering, says about it: "You need a perfect storm," Edwards said. "You have to the have the right concentrations of dust in the air, you need sufficient oxygen, and you need an ignition source." So they really have to work at it to make it happen, it ain't that easy........

Chemical Safety Board releases report on three ("let's count 'em, THREE) fatality explosions at the same plant in January, March and May or 2011. Nice of them to take a month off between incidents and being merchants of death to give the remaining employees time to mourn, wasn't it?.............The Safety Board's Conclusions for key issues were (oh my, I'm Shocked!): Hazard recognition and training....... Engineering controls.........Fire codes/enforcement........and Regulatory oversight.